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Fertile Soil for Structural Funds?
A Panel Data Analysis of the Conditional Eﬀectiveness of
European Cohesion Policy
Sjef Ederveen, Henri L.F. de Groot and Richard Nahuis
I. INTRODUCTION
Structural Funds are the most important policy instrument used by the
European Union (EU) to promote regional development of its member states
and to speed up the process of convergence. At present, it covers about a third
of the total EUbudget1. An important question is how eﬀective these funds are
in promoting economic growth and reducing welfare diﬀerences in the EU. In
the light of the recent enlargement of the EU this question becomes evenmore
pressing. This paper aims at empirically investigating this question.
This paper relates to a quickly expanding literature that evaluates the
eﬀectiveness of the European cohesion policy. Basically, three evaluation
methods are used: model simulation, case studies and econometric evaluation.
For a recent review of the diﬀerent economic evaluation methods, we refer to
Ederveen et al. (2002). The econometric evaluations, to which this study be-
longs, consist of analyses of regional economic growth (see, for example,
Boldrin and Canova 2001, Dall’erba and Le Gallo 2003) or studies that
examine the impact of cohesion policy within one speciﬁc country (see, for
example,De la Fuente andVives 1995, on Spain). This paper complements the
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1. A short overview of European Cohesion policy and its history is presented in Appendix A.
class of econometric evaluations by performing a cross-country panel data
analysis2.
The country-level analysis has important merits. First – compared to
regional growth regressions – the analysis is less sensitive to leakage or spil-
lover eﬀects. Spillover eﬀects occur, for example, when a backward region
improves its infrastructure, while as a consequence a construction ﬁrm in a
wealthyneighbouring region experiences a positive demand shock. Second, the
allocation of funds across regions might be sensitive to crowding out (that is,
national governments changing the allocation of their support to backward
regions in response to receipts fromtheEU).The analysis of the eﬀectiveness of
the EU support on a regional level is troubled by such a mechanism; the
country-level analysis on the contrary is insensitive for this. Third, a country-
level analysis allows one to control for variables that are unavailable at the
regional level. Obvious examples are educational attainment rates, which are
only reliable on a country level, and institutional quality variables, which are
not available ona regional level.Fourth, regional growthanalyses suﬀer froma
severe selection problem. A country-level analysis substantially lessens this
problem. As Structural Funds are allocated to regions in a non-randomway –
the funds are allocated to regions that are relatively poor – the regional growth
analysis suﬀers from an endogeneity problem. Given that all countries have
regions that are relatively poor, even from a European point of view, this
endogeneity problem (which is otherwise hard to solve) is much less of a
problem.
In its approach, this paper bears close similarity to that of Burnside and
Dollar (2000).Theyassess the eﬀectiveness of aidongrowthwitha focuson less
developed countries. Their major result is that aid is at best conditionally
eﬀective: only countries with relatively solid domestic policies are positively
aﬀected by aid. Theymeasure good policies by an openness variable capturing
among others the black market premium, inﬂation and the budget deﬁcit
(cf. Sachs andWarner 1995). In a related paper, Gallup et al. (1999) show that
locational factors are relevant in explaining growth diﬀerences. Their basic
argument is that landlocked regions are more vulnerable to policy-induced
ineﬃcient allocations of scarce resources as opposed to open regions.
Building on these ideas, this paper aims to assess whether Structural Funds
are eﬀective, and what conditions aﬀect the eﬀectiveness. The paper has two
major results. First, we show that Structural Funds as such do not explain
growth diﬀerentials among the member states. Second, however, Structural
Funds allocated to economieswith ‘good’ institutions are eﬀective. Thequality
2. The only other paper using pooled cross-section analysis that we are aware of is Beugelsdijk and
Eijﬃnger (2005). Compared to our study, their analysis covers a shorter time span and lacks a clear
link with theoretically based econometric growth studies.
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of institutions will – in the context of this study – be proxied by several
quantitative measures, including corruption, inﬂation and openness. Hence,
EU support is conditionally eﬀective.
Apart from assessing the (conditional) eﬀectiveness of Structural Funds and
the type of conditions that are important, this paper contributes to the litera-
ture on growth more generally. Especially, by focussing on support to coun-
tries in the European Union, the paper adds to the literature on the condi-
tionality of aid that has so far focussed on aid to less developed countries (see,
for example, Burnside and Dollar 2000, Easterly 2003 and Hudson 20043, for
recent contributions to this rapidly expanding ﬁeld of research)4.
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the theoretical background of
the model that we estimate. Section III presents the basic regression results,
whereas Section IV explores a wide variety of institutional variables. Section V
examines the robustness of the results. The conclusions are contained in
Section VI.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The aim of this section is to provide the theoretical background for the
empirical analysis that will follow. In doing so, we avoid developing a full-
ﬂedged theoretical model. For such a model, we refer to Burnside and Dollar
(1997),whohave shownhowaid can straightforwardlybe incorporated into an
otherwise standard neoclassical growth model.
The major variable of interest for this study is the amount of Structural
Funds (SF ) received by a country. In analysing the eﬀectiveness of these
Structural Funds in stimulating growth, it is important to realize (i) that the
Structural Funds can be seen as an income transfer, (ii) that the Structural
Funds have to be co-funded by the receiving country, and (iii) that the Funds
oftenhave to be spent onpre-speciﬁedprojects.Given these characteristics, it is
impossible to formulate an unambiguous hypothesis on the expected eﬀect of
Structural Funds on economic growth. Depending on the circumstances, the
eﬀect can be positive, negative or zero. If aid by means of the provision of
Structural Funds were seen as an unconditional transfer, the GDP of an
economy that is located on the production frontier would not be aﬀected and
the expected coeﬃcient would be zero5. We can rule this out, however, as the
3. This paper forms the introduction to a feature of The Economic Journal on ‘Aid and Development’,
which also contains interesting papers by Dalgaard et al. (2004), Mosley et al. (2004) and Collier and
Dollar (2004).
4. In addition, we ﬁnd that the augmented neoclassical model – the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)
version– iswell suited todescribeEuropeangrowth. In establishing this result,wemakeuse of the new
data on human capital constructed by De la Fuente and Dome´nech (2000).
5. GNP would be aﬀected immediately.
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EU requires the Structural Funds to be invested. The basic hypothesis in a
neoclassical frameworkwould hence be that the Structural Fundswould foster
economic growth as they increase the rate of investments. Three important
reservations have to be made, however. First, the Funds are often required to
be invested in speciﬁc projects. These projects need not be growth promoting,
but might – for example – enhance cultural or environmental values. Further-
more, these projects can absorb complementary factors such as human capital
thatwouldotherwise beallocated towardspotentiallymore attractive activities
in terms of growth. Second, the Structural Funds have to be co-funded by
domestic tax revenues. In a case where taxation is highly distortionary, the net
growth eﬀect may well be negative. Third, corruption may take Funds away
from productive activities.
The bottom line of this discussion is that the Structural Funds are at best
conditionally eﬀective. These conditions determine the type of project that is
ﬁnanced by means of the Structural Funds, the distortions resulting from the
required co-funding, and the potential distortions in the allocation of produc-
tion factors. In operationalising these ideas, we assume that the eﬀectiveness
of investments depends on the ‘institutional quality’ of the receiving country.
Though the literature on growth convincingly argues that ‘institutionsmatter’,
the operationalisation of the concept is more controversial. The details of our
operationalisation can be found in Appendix B, but in this section we discuss
the theoretical considerations behind the indicators.
In assuming the Structural Funds to be conditionally eﬀective, the basic
idea is that resources can be allocated either toward productive activities or to
‘rent-seeking’ activities and that the set of rules and institutions in a country
determines this allocation. The eﬀectiveness of Structural Funds might thus
depend on this allocation and the Structural Funds might even aﬀect this
allocation. Let us give three concrete examples of how this could work. First,
Structural Funds could provide attractive, proﬁtable options for public
oﬃcials to obtain private beneﬁts, in case of a lack of accountability. Murphy
et al. (1991) show that increased opportunities for rent seekingmight induce an
allocation of talent that is harmful to economic growth. Second, barriers to
international trade cause an ineﬃcient allocation of resources and can provide
ample opportunities for diversion activities; extracting part of the duty
payments might, for example, raise the net beneﬁt of a customhouse oﬃcial
(see Hall and Jones 1997)6. On a similar note, less open economies typically
experience less policy competition on politicians and they might therefore be
induced to answer the calls of special interest groups. Therefore the institu-
tional quality of closed economies tends to be worse. We can therefore
6. Although it can be optimal to set a positive tariﬀ if a country has market power, setting a tariﬀ could
create lucrative opportunities for rent seeking.
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hypothesise that economies that are less open facemore problems in eﬃciently
allocating the Structural Funds to the most growth-promoting projects,
implying – ceteris paribus – that the eﬀectiveness of the Structural Funds is
conditional on openness. Third, for the allocation of the Structural Funds
between productive and unproductive projects, more eﬃcient transactions in
the market support productive activities. For eﬃcient market transactions,
contract enforcement is crucial. Corruption and low bureaucratic quality
undermine this. Alternatively, as Knack and Keefer (1997) argue, trust is
important to overcome contractual incompleteness. Building on these theore-
tical ideas, wewill select several proxies that we use as conditioning variables to
analyse the eﬀectiveness of Structural Funds in promoting economic growth
and convergence.
III. REGRESSION RESULTS
Given the aspects that we have argued to be relevant in analysing the eﬀect-
iveness of Structural Funds, we estimate the following pooled cross-section
regression equation:
git ¼ b0 þ b1 lnðyitÞ þ b2 lnðsk;itÞ þ b3 lnðsh;itÞ þ b4 lnðnit þ gA þ dÞ
þ b5SFit þ b6CONDitSFit þ eit ð1Þ
where the dependent variable git is the average annual growth rate of real GDP
per capita over the period under consideration7. As in the standard framework
of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992; henceforth MRW), we include as
explanatory variables initial GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars (yit),
the average gross domestic savings rate (sk,it), the rate of human capital
accumulation (sh,it), the population growth rate (nit), the exogenous rate of
technological progress (gA), and the rate of depreciation (d). Most of these
variables are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank
2000). Our proxy for human capital is taken fromDe laFuente andDome´nech
(2000). A more detailed discussion of sources and deﬁnitions of all the data is
relegated to Appendix B. In measuring European aid, we restrict attention to
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This is by far the most
important of the funds and especially meant to help relatively poor EU
members. Appendix A provides further information on European cohesion
policy and the distribution of Structural Funds over the member states. In the
regression equation, we use the natural logarithm of 1 plus the amount of
Structural Funds as a fraction of GDP8, indicated by the variable SFi. Finally,
7. For a period of T years starting at t5t0, we deﬁne the growth rate of x as gt05 [ln(t01T)ln(xt0)]/T.
8. We add 1 to the share of Structural Funds as a fraction ofGDP because this share can be zero and we
want to include the natural logarithm of Structural Funds in the regression equation.
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CONDi denotes a conditioning variable capturing aspects of the institutional
quality of the country. We will specify this variable later in this section in
greater detail.
Weuse data for thirteenEUcountries9 (Austria,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom). Our panel data set covers seven ﬁve-year periods from
1960–1965 through 1990–1995. Following Islam (1995), an observation in our
data set thus captures a country’s performance averaged over a ﬁve-year period.
In a recent review of the convergence literature, Islam (2003) discusses the
potential of diﬀerent methods to study convergence in some detail and con-
cludes that ‘[o]verall, thepanel approachhas several advantages in convergence
research’ (p. 332). That is not to say that it is without problems. One problem
is the frequency with which data are considered. The use of ﬁve-year spans is
defended by Islam (2003).
Another problem is the possibility of small sample bias. Many diﬀerent
estimators have been developed to estimate dynamic panel data models.
Theoretical properties of most of these estimators are asymptotic and similar.
In most of the remainder, we use pooled OLS to estimate the dynamic panel
data model. In Section V we also present estimates obtained with country-
and period-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects estimators and the GMM estimators of
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The results are
comparable to those in our basic speciﬁcations with respect to the eﬀect of
Structural Funds10.
As is standard in thegrowth literature,we takegA1d tobe equal to5%forall
countries and time periods (see, e.g., MRW). Note that by putting b55b650,
we have the standard neoclassical growth model as it was introduced and
empirically estimated in a cross-country context by MRW (1992) and later
extended to a panel-data context by Islam (1995). As a point of reference, we
ﬁrst estimate this basic MRW model. The results are presented in the ﬁrst
column of Table 1 and are consistent with theoretical predictions11. Further-
more, the null hypothesis that the parameters for sk and sh sum to the negative
of the parameter for the population growth is not rejected. Therefore, in the
second column we show the results of the restricted regression. From these
9. We do not include Germany, because of the structural break in the data due to uniﬁcation, or
Luxembourg, because human capital data are unavailable.
10. We have two reasons for not using country- and period-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in our basic
speciﬁcations. First, we use institutional variables that have no – or at best limited – time-series
variation. Second, ﬁxed eﬀects do not ‘explain’ growth economically but only statistically, and
thereby essentially capture merely ‘the measure of our ignorance’.
11. We also performed regressions with the Barro-Lee human capital data, but the results were less
satisfactory in terms of statistical signiﬁcance and goodness of ﬁt. We take this as evidence for the
superior quality of the data by Dome´nech and De la Fuente.
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results, we can infer the rate of convergence and the production elasticities of
physical and human capital (corresponding to the respective capital income
shares). These values are 0.027, 0.292 and 0.29212. The rate of convergence
is slightly higher than the OECD estimates obtained by MRW. The capital
income share of 0.29 is fairly close to the common sense value of one-third. The
results thus support the validity of the augmentedneoclassical growthmodel in
explaining economic growth in EU countries.
Toassess the eﬀectivenessofEuropeancohesionpolicy,we start by including
the variable SF in the basic regression Section V. The other parameters are
hardly inﬂuenced by this, as can be seen from the results in the third column of
Table 1. The impact of the Structural Funds itself is not signiﬁcant. If anything,
Structural Funds are found to have a negative impact on economic growth13.
Table 1
The conditional eﬀectiveness of Structural Funds: main results
(OLS, dependent variable: growth of GDP per capita)
Basic Restricted Basic
with SF
SF and
Institutional
Quality
Log of initial GDP per capita 0.028 0.026 0.028 0.028
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log of investment rate 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.020
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log of human capital 0.023 0.018 0.023 0.022
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Log of (population growth10.05) 0.023 0.030 0.024
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Structural Funds 0.015 0.141
(0.012) (0.043)
Structural Funds  Institutional Quality 0.018
(0.007)
Constant 0.202 0.158 0.190 0.208
(0.055) (0.033) (0.057) (0.058)
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.51
Joint signiﬁcance test SF variables 11.91
# panel observations 91 91 91 91
Notes:White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses., , and
 denote signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. The test for the joint signiﬁcance of
the Structural Funds variables is a Wald test, testing the null-hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for
the Structural Funds variables (in levels and interacted with institutional quality) are equal to zero.
See Appendix B for details about the variables and their sources.
12. The rate of convergence (l) is solved from0.02655(1e5l). Solving for a and b requires using
the ﬁrst three estimated coeﬃcients (see Islam 1995).
13. It may take some time for the eﬀects of Structural Funds to show up in countries’ growth
performance. Although our results are based on periods of ﬁve years, one can imagine that time
lags are longer than this. For this reason, we have also included Structural Funds one period lagged
(viz. a period of ﬁve years). This hardly aﬀects the results (see Section V).
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Next, we explore the question of conditionality. As explained in Section II, our
basic idea is that Structural Funds may only be beneﬁcial if the recipient
country uses them in productive projects.However, if they are used to continue
intrinsic loss-making activities, they obviously will not have a positive eﬀect.
We use a measure for institutional quality to control for this. In the speciﬁca-
tions inTable 1, the measure that we use is the institutional quality index from
Sachs and Warner (1995); see Appendix B for details.
Including the interaction term of SF and institutional quality, the results
become markedly diﬀerent, as can be seen from comparing the last two
columns in Table 1. The measure for Structural Funds remains negative and
becomes signiﬁcant, whereas the interaction of Structural Funds with institu-
tional quality is signiﬁcantly positive14. A Wald test conﬁrms that the two
coeﬃcients are statistically jointly highly signiﬁcant. This suggests that eco-
nomies with good institutional quality beneﬁt from the funds whereas those
with bad institutions lower their growth performance. That Structural Funds
are only conditionally eﬀective is our basic result. In the next section we will
perform a robustness check on our results by using a wide range of alternative
measures to proxy for ‘institutional quality’.
IV. DIFFERENTMEASURES FOR INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
The empirical growth literature is frequently plagued by the criticism that
‘everything can be shown, provided that ‘good’ proxies are used’. To avoid this
kind of critique this section presents regression results with diﬀerent variables
that proxy for ‘institutional quality’. By using awide range of proxies, we intend
to provide a fair, complete and reliable view of the conditional eﬀective-
ness of Structural Funds.
We distinguish three broad groups of institutional quality variables that we
will use as conditioning variables (COND) in estimating our regression model
introduced in Section III. First, there are variables directly related to the
outcomes of government policy: inﬂation and the government savings.
Although admittedly crude, inﬂation can be seen as an indication of the degree
to which governments give in to certain pressures. Central government savings
indicates the extent to which governments absorb ﬁnancial resources available
in a country. Second, we have variables that can be summarized as indicating
social cohesion. We report results on trust. This proxy is also used by, for
14. The results are hardly aﬀected when the institutional quality variable is included separately in the
regression equation. See Section V for more details. Here, we focus on the speciﬁcation excluding
institutional quality in levels. This choice is based on statistical grounds (institutional quality itself is
insigniﬁcant) as well as on reasons of presentational clarity.
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example, Knack and Keefer (1997)15. The third group of indicators aims to
measure institutional quality directly by using a corruption perception index,
openness or an index for the quality of governance. Appendix B discusses the
sources and deﬁnitions of these indicators in more detail.
Table 2 reports the estimation results when diﬀerent indicators are used for
the conditioning variable CONDi in the basic regression equation (results for
other proxies are available in Appendix C). A ﬁrst general remark is that the
regression results as far as the eﬀects of savings in physical and human capital
and (conditional) convergence are concerned are hardly aﬀected by the use of
diﬀerent proxies for institutional quality.
Table 2
Diﬀerent measures for institutional quality
(OLS, dependent variable: growth of GDP per capita)
Institutional conditioning variable
Inﬂation Trusta Openness Corruption
Log of initial GDP per capita 0.027 0.024 0.025 0.027
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log of investment rate 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.020
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Log of human capital 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.019
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Log of (population growth10.05) 0.037 0.025 0.034 0.028
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Structural Funds 0.184 0.047 0.285 0.112
(0.098) (0.035) (0.082) (0.033)
SF  Conditioning variable
(see column header)
0.109 0.002 0.064 0.016
(0.066) (0.001) (0.021) (0.006)
Constant 0.170 0.187 0.165 0.193
(0.056) (0.057) (0.053) (0.056)
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.44 0.53 0.51
Joint signiﬁcance test SF variables 5.69 1.04 13.94 11.55
# panel observations 91 84 91 91
Notes:White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. , , and
denote signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and10per cent levels, respectively.The test for the joint signiﬁcance of the
Structural Funds variables is a Wald test, testing the null-hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for the
Structural Funds variables (in levels and interacted with institutional quality) are equal to zero.
Results including the institutional conditioning variable in levels in the regression equation can be
found in theAnnex to this paper atwww.henridegroot.net/downloads.asp. SeeAppendixB for details
about the variables and their sources.
aThe ‘trust variable’ is not available for Greece.
15. Results using proxies such as norms of civic cooperation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are
comparable and available upon request.
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In the ﬁrst columnwe report the conditionality of SF aid on inﬂation16. The
interaction term is borderline signiﬁcant at the 10% level (p-value50.104).
Hence, the soil for SFaid ismore fertile if inﬂation is low.For thegovernmental
budget (detailed results can be found in Appendix C) we cannot draw an
analogous conclusion; budget deﬁcits are not signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the
eﬀectiveness of SF. Of the measures for social cohesion we report only the
trust variable (the others basically tell the same story). Although the estimated
coeﬃcientshave the same signsaswith theother indicators, the impact of social
cohesion variables for enhancing the eﬀectiveness of SF aid is not signiﬁcant.
A diﬀerent proxy for institutional quality is the degree of openness of a
country, i.e., thedegree inwhich a country faces foreigncompetition.Openness
is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of exports plus imports divided by GDP17.
The basic idea is that this openness variable captures the pressure on countries
to eﬃciently use the Structural Funds. Openness is – at best – an imperfect
proxy18, but it has the advantage of greater data availability for the accession
countries. Openness seems to be a good proxy, as it gives results comparable to
the institutional quality measure in Table 1.
The last column reports the results for another fairly direct measure of
institutional quality, viz. corruption. This also gives rise to a roughly similar
andhighly signiﬁcant result. The same conclusions are reachedwhenweuse the
Governance Indicators constructed byKaufmann et al. (2002). The results for
someof these regressionsare relegated toAppendixCas these indicators are less
widely used than the ones we discuss here. The evidence therefore clearly
suggests that SF aid ismore eﬀective in countries with high-quality institutions
or with low perceived corruption.
In the remainder of this paper, we consider the speciﬁcations with institu-
tional quality and corruption as our most preferred speciﬁcations. As said
before, we also use the openness speciﬁcation as the data availability for
openness is better. In order to give some more feeling for the economic
signiﬁcance of our results we report in Table 3 for illustrational purposes – for
our three preferred speciﬁcations – the implied semi-elasticity of the SF for
16. For comparability with the other institutional variables we use four minus the log of average
inﬂation. In that case the resulting variable is positive and a higher value reﬂects higher institutional
quality.
17. We could alternatively use imports (or exports) divided by GDP, but these measures are highly
correlated and the results are hardly aﬀected by the choice for a particular proxy.
18. Openness is a ‘catchall’ variable. It, for example, depends on the size of the country. To assess its
validity in a simple way, we have determined the correlation of our openness variable with the more
generally accepted openness variable that was constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995) for a much
more extensive cross-section of countries (we did not use the Sachs and Warner index itself in our
analysis for EU countries, because then almost all EU countries would be labelled as open). The
correlation between these two measures of openness is obtained from a simple linear regression
equation and equals 0.28 (p-value50.002). Details are available upon request.
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diﬀerent countries discussed above. These implied semi-elasticitiesmeasure the
predicted increase in the growth rate (inpercentagepoints) in response toa1%-
point increase in the share of Structural Funds inGDP, taking into account the
institutional quality of the country in question. For example, an increase in the
amountof StructuralFundsof 1%ofGDP tobe receivedbyGreece results in a
reduction of the growth rate of 1.58 percentage points (based on the results
taking institutional quality as the conditioning variable). The countries are
ordered by the size of the elasticity19. A few results stand out. First, in Greece
andPortugal the elasticity is negative in all speciﬁcations. Second, the southern
EU members tend to be clustered around the low and negative values of the
elasticity whereas the northernEUmembers are clustered around the high and
positive elasticities, representing relatively aid-conducive institutions. Third,
the current allocation of the ERDF is largely focussed on the countries with
negative elasticities20.Anotherwayof illustrating the economicmeaningofour
results is to determine the contribution of the actually received amount of
Structural Funds to the explained part of the growth rate (viz. b5 SF 1
b6 COND SF in equation (1)). If we take Spain, Ireland and theNetherlands
as examples, the results reveal that the actually received amount of Structural
Funds to the explained part of the growth rate for these three countries equals,
respectively, 0.36%-points, 0.31%-points and 0.03%-points (derived
Table 3
Implied semi-elasticities for three speciﬁcations for EU–15
SF and institutional quality SF and corruption SF and openness
Greece 1.58 Greece 1.56 Italy 2.90
Spain 0.31 Italy 1.43 France 2.84
Portugal 0.16 Belgium 0.33 Germany 2.55
Italy 0.20 Portugal 0.31 Spain 2.25
Ireland 0.24 France 0.21 United Kingdom 2.16
France 1.49 Spain 0.08 Finland 1.90
United Kingdom 1.58 Ireland 0.44 Greece 1.55
Austria 1.71 Germany 0.56 Sweden 1.49
Germany 1.87 Austria 1.01 Denmark 1.04
Sweden 1.96 United Kingdom 1.56 Portugal 0.45
Finland 1.98 Luxembourg 1.95 Austria 0.40
Denmark 2.01 The Netherlands 2.14 The Netherlands 0.76
Belgium 2.03 Sweden 2.35 Ireland 0.93
The Netherlands 2.17 Denmark 2.93 Belgium 1.84
Luxembourg 2.30 Finland 3.32 Luxembourg 3.53
19. The elasticities are calculated for all EU countries.We use the observations for the last 5-year period
for the conditioning variables to calculate the elasticity.
20. SeeAppendixA for a brief account of the allocation of theERDFandEderveen et al. (2002) formore
details.
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from the regression equation using institutional quality as the conditioning
variable) 21.
In order to assess the implications of these results for the countries that
recently joined the European Union or that intend to enter in the (near) future,
we have calculated the implied semi-elasticities for these countries (note that for
institutional quality and corruption, we do not have data for all accession
countries). In interpreting these results, one has to keep inmind that these results
are based on out-of-sample predictions. Care is therefore required in the
interpretation.The results are presented inTable 4. Based on the semi-elasticities
for the institutional indicators, one has to conclude that the prospects for
eﬀective use of Structural Funds in the accession countries are limited. This
reﬂects the fact that the institutional quality and perceived corruption inmost of
these countries areworse than inGreece,which featured the lowest valuesamong
the EU countries included in our analysis (see Table 3). When considering the
semi-elasticities based on openness, the picture is more positive. However, here
we have to take into account that openness catches more than the institutional
quality alone. It is well known that small countries tend to be more open; hence
the relative size of the countries aﬀects the results, as is clear from Table 4.
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
The results presented so far strongly suggest that the Structural Funds are only
conditionally eﬀective.However, itmaybe institutional quality as such, instead
of the interaction with Structural Funds, that enhances growth. Or the results
Table 4
Implied semi-elasticities for accession countries
SF and institutional quality SF and corruption SF and openness
Malta 3.85 Romania 4.62 Turkey 4.08
Turkey 3.35 Latvia 3.95 Poland 2.76
Cyprus 2.49 Turkey 3.72 Romania 2.32
Slovak Republic 3.61 Hungary 1.28
Bulgaria 3.38 Bulgaria 0.09
Czech Republic 3.38 Lithuania 0.76
Poland 3.16 Czech Republic 0.86
Lithuania 2.37 Cyprus 0.91
Slovenia 1.91 Latvia 1.05
Hungary 1.80 Slovak Republic 1.27
Estonia 1.46 Slovenia 1.87
Estonia 2.41
Malta 3.72
21. Details on these growth eﬀects for all countries and conditioning variables are available upon
request.
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might simply reﬂect the extraordinary economic performance of Ireland.
This section deals with a number of these issues by performing an extensive
robustness analysis. Table 5 summarizes the results. We start from the basic
equation with Structural Funds conditioned on institutional quality. The
results are repeated in the ﬁrst column of Table 5. For this speciﬁcation we
adddiﬀerent variables, include Structural Funds one period lagged, change the
sample, use diﬀerent data sources, account for country- and period-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects and apply more advanced estimation techniques in the form
of GMM estimators. The results reveal that our major result – Structural
Funds are conditionally eﬀective – is robust to these changes. Furthermore,
this conclusion is not aﬀected by using diﬀerent conditioning variables. This is
shown in Appendix C, where the analysis of this section is repeated with
openness instead of institutional quality as the conditioning variable.
The ﬁrst variation that we consider is the inclusion of the conditioning
variable itself as it is possible that institutional quality as such is the driving
force behind growth. The results, reported in the second column of the table,
clearly show that it is not institutional quality itself thatmatters. The estimated
coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. The other coeﬃcients do still support
the hypothesis of conditional eﬀectiveness of Structural Funds (the p-value
corresponding to the conditionality term is 0.06). A more detailed account of
the eﬀects of including institutional quality in levels can be found in theAnnex
to this paper, in which we have added institutional quality to all the regression
models that we have estimated.
Second, we have investigated the potential importance of lagged eﬀects.
Structural Funds are often used to ﬁnance infrastructural types of projects.
For such projects, it may take some time for the growth eﬀects to materialise.
Although we have alleviated this concern by using ﬁve-year periods in our
estimates, we have additionally estimated models in which Structural Funds
have been included one period lagged (viz. 5 years). As can be seen fromTable
5, this hardly aﬀects the results.
Third, we analysed whether the exceptional growth record of Ireland is
driving the results. This is investigated in the third column inTable 5 by leaving
out Ireland. Again the results are not very sensitive for this change.
Fourth, we disentangle the inﬂuence of joining the EU and the receipt of
cohesion support. Therefore we constructed a period dummy variable that
equals one when a country was a member of the EU in that period, and zero
otherwise. Including this dummy variable does not weaken the strength of the
conditional eﬀectiveness, but nevertheless shows that European integration
itself tends to contribute to growth (though the estimate is not signiﬁcant at the
10%-level). This result suggests that two separate eﬀects are at stake (seeCrespo-
Cuaresma et al. 2001, for a more detailed discussion and empirical analysis of
the returns to EU membership).
r 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 29
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Fifth, we have tested whether the results are driven either by the distinct
performance of some of the countries under consideration or by diﬀerent
behaviour in diﬀerent periods of our sample, for example because of business
cycle eﬀects. These options are tested by including country- and period-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects in the sixth and seventh columnofTable 5, respectively.The results
further reinforce the idea of the Structural Funds being only conditionally
eﬀective. In the speciﬁcation with country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, we see that the
coeﬃcient of the log of investments becomes smaller and statistically insignif-
icant. This reﬂects the fact that variation over time of investments is limited.
The eﬀect of investments is therefore mainly picked up by the ﬁxed eﬀects.
For human capital the coeﬃcient remains stable but is no longer signiﬁcant.
In the speciﬁcation with period-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, we see that the co-
eﬃcient of the log of human capital becomes very small (and insigniﬁcant).
This reﬂects the fact thathumancapital develops similarly in all the countries in
the sample over time. The eﬀect is therefore picked up by the period-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects22.
Sixth, we have analysed the sensitivity of the results for the period used in
the regression analysis. For most countries, the Structural Funds only started
to be obtained in the late 1970s. In the years before, we have set the Structural
Funds at zero in our dataset. To check the sensitivity of our results for this, we
have restricted the time span to 1975–1995. The results are reported in the
seventh column of Table 5. Apart from the reduced statistical signiﬁcance of
investments, both the qualitative as well as the quantitative results are hardly
aﬀected23.
Seventh, we have re-estimated our basic regression equation with data from
the Penn World Tables, Mark 6.1 (instead of using the data from the World
Development Indicators). The results again conﬁrm our major result: Struc-
tural Funds as such are not eﬀective in enhancing growth, but they are if they
are seeded in fertile soil.
Finally, the last two speciﬁcations are based on the application of recently
developedGMMestimators (Arellano and Bond 1991 and Blundell and Bond
1998)24. We refer to Bond et al. (2001) for an application to the estimation of
empirical growthmodels and adiscussionof the various estimation techniques.
In the Arellano-Bond approach, the regression equation is written in the form
22. These results obtained by including country- and period-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects basically illustrate that
the variation in investments and human capital over time and across countries in the sample of
countries that we consider in this study is limited.
23. We have done the entire analysis in this paper for both the period 1975–1995 as well as 1980–1995.
Both qualitative as well as quantitative results are reasonably robust for changes in the time period.
Details are available upon request.
24. All the GMM estimations were performed with OX version 3.30 and the DPD package version 1.2
(available as freeware at www.nuﬀ.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik).
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of a dynamicmodel. By takingﬁrst-diﬀerences, time-invariant country-speciﬁc
eﬀects are removed. The right-hand-side variables in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
equation are instrumented. In doing so, one solves the problem of omitted
variable biases that are constant over time, parameters are estimated consis-
tently despite the endogeneity of right-hand-side variables and it allows for
consistent estimation in the presence ofmeasurement error. This approachwas
subsequently reﬁned by Blundell and Bond (1998). They introduced a system
GMM estimator that is highly recommended for empirical growth research
(cf. Bond et al. 2001). Both the Arellano-Bond-speciﬁcation and the Blundell-
Bond-speciﬁcation are reported in Table 5. The results reveal the well-known
fact that the estimated speedof convergence is substantially larger in theGMM
estimates. The eﬀect of Structural Funds becomes statistically less signiﬁcant,
but remains similar in quantitative terms25.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
How eﬀective are Structural Funds in promoting economic growth and
convergence in the member states of the European Union? Building
on a standard neoclassical growth framework, we ﬁnd that European
support as such did not improve the countries’ growth performance. How-
ever, we ﬁnd evidence that it enhances growth in countries with the
‘right’ institutions. This conclusion is in line with the recent empirical ﬁndings
on the eﬀectiveness of aid to less developed countries by Burnside and Dollar
(2000).
The analysis reveals which type of institution matters, as institutions are
measured in several ways. Social cohesion is not an important conditioning
factor. The government policy indicators are not signiﬁcant at the 5% level
in determining the eﬀectiveness of the Structural Funds. However, when
conditioning for openness and the direct measures for institutional quality,
we ﬁnd robust and signiﬁcant conditional eﬀectiveness of the Structural
Funds. So, the European policy to promote regional growth is only condition-
ally eﬀective. This ﬁndingbears considerable consequences for the (re-)designof
theEUcohesion policy in light of the enlargement of theEU: the funds are to be
allocated toward institution building in the ﬁrst instance. Once the institutions
are of a suﬃcient quality, the fundsmaybe eﬀective in stimulating (catching-up)
growth.
25. The implied semi-elasticities range from1.02 (1.70) for Greece to 4.96 (2.23) for Luxembourg in
the Arelano-Bond (Blundell-Bond) speciﬁcation.
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APPENDICES
A. A Brief History of EU Cohesion Policy
The ﬁrst serious mention of cohesion policy can be found in the 1957 EEC
treaty of Rome. This treaty did not yet, however, provide for substantial
instruments by which this policy could be implemented. Only from 1975
onwards did cohesion policy take oﬀ with the introduction of the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Its share of the EU budget was then
about 5%. Subsequently, numerous other funds have been introduced. Their
combined share is nowabout 40%(corresponding to 0.35%ofEUGDP).This
makes cohesion policy the second most important budget item (after the
CommonAgricultural Policy). Below,wepresent a brief overviewofEuropean
Cohesion policy and its evolution throughout the years.
Structural Funds before 1989
In the early days of theEEC, exemption for state aid aimedat reducing regional
disparities came closest to the present cohesion policy. At the 1974 Paris
summit, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was introduced.
The ﬁrst enlargement of the Union with the accession of the UK, Ireland and
Denmark worked as a catalyst: the UK expected no substantial beneﬁt from
theCommonAgricultural Policy, and sought some formof compensation. For
the period 1975–1977, an ERDF of 1300 million ECU was decided upon.
In subsequent years, the size of theFund increased rapidly. The amount that
was yearly allocated to the ERDF reached 1 billion ECU in 1980, 2 billion in
1983 and 3 billion in 1986. TheERDF therefore soon represented a substantial
instrument of Community regional policy.Meanwhile, the ERDFwas revised
twice, in 1979 and in 1984. Originally the Fund was not subdivided. The
European Summit allocated the most important shares of the Fund to those
countries which had the most serious regional problems in terms of both size
and intensity. In the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the ERDF, the main beneﬁciaries of the
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Fund were Italy, the UK and France, with respectively about 40%, 28% and
16% of the total Fund.With the accession of Greece in 1981, it also received a
substantial part of the pie, viz. about 13%.
The enlargement with Spain and Portugal induced a revision and extension
of the ERDF in 1984. Worries, notably on the part of France and Italy,
about the impact of the Iberian enlargement caused an expansion of the
funds with Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. Also the management of
the ERDF was made more ﬂexible. Instead of assigning every member state a
ﬁxedpart of theFund, a systemof lowerandupper limitswas introduced. Italy,
for instance, received between 32 and 43% of the ERDF in 1985. Many of the
characteristics and principles of the ERDFhave been retained in the reform of
the Structural Funds in 1989, to which we turn now.
Reform of the Structural Funds in 1988
The Single European Act (1986) recognized regional policy for the ﬁrst time
oﬃcially as aCommunity task. This recognition, togetherwith the accession of
Spain and Portugal in 1986, induced a major reform and extension of the
Structural Funds in 1988. The reforms of the Structural Funds were – being
part of the Delors I package – intimately related to the establishment of the
Internal Market. From the Single European Act onwards, Structural Funds
were allocatedwithin ‘operationalperiods’, theﬁrst running from1989 to 1993,
the second from 1994 to 1999. In these periods, several allocation rules were
introduced.
The central guiding principles that were established were: concentration
(geographically as well as with respect to objectives), programming (not only
separate projects, but larger programmes, such as those that already existed in
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes), partnership (between the EU,
Member states and regional authorities) and additionality (prevention of
crowding out of national regional policy). Importantly, the explicit purpose
of cohesion policy was established, namely to enhance cohesion and to reduce
welfare diﬀerences among the regions of EU.
Since 1989, European cohesion policy addresses regional problems under
diﬀerent Objectives and with diﬀerent Funds. By far the most important
objective is focussed on regions where development is lagging behind (viz.
Objective1 regionswhichare regionswithaper capitaGDPof less than75%of
theCommunity average). It accounts for about two-thirds of total resources in
the two operational periods 1989–994 and 1994–999. The other objectives
are targeted at areas aﬀected by industrial decline (Objective 2), ﬁghting
long-term unemployment (Objective 3), adaptation to industrial change
(Objective 4), reform of agricultural sectors (Objective 5a), rural areas
(Objective 5b) and sparsely populated areas (Objective 6). Objective 1 and
other objectives are mutually exclusive. People in a region receive either
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support under Objective I or under other objectives or receive nothing at all.
Objective 6 was introduced only in 1994with the accession of Finland, Sweden
and Austria.
Besides the ERDF, the EU also introduced a number of other ﬁnancial
instruments to implement the structural policies. The most important of these
are the European Social Fund (ESF), the Guidance Section of the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the Cohesion
Fund (CF).However, theEuropeanRegionalDevelopmentFund remainedby
far the largest of the Structural Funds. It accounts for more than half of the
total European Cohesion policy.
Just as in the years before the reform, the EU-wide regional policy has
continued togrow.The shareof the totalEUbudget increased fromunder 30%
for the period 1989–1993 to over 35% for the second planning period
(1994–1999). As can be expected from the focus on less developed regions,
the Funds are unevenly spread across the member states of the European
FigureA1
Distribution of the European Regional Development Fund over member states
(as percentage of GDP)
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Union. The ﬁgure below shows the division of the ERDF as a percentage of
GDP over the member states for the last ﬁve-year period in our sample
(1990–1995). As is clear from the ﬁgure, Portugal, Greece and Ireland get
relatively most support.
The current cohesion policy, 2000–2006
Since the Berlin meeting of the European Council, the Agenda 2000
agreement has called for a further revision of European cohesion policy. It
spells out that the Funds should address problems under three, rather than six
Objectives:
Objective 1: for regions whose development is lagging behind
Objective 2: for economic and social conversion of areas facing structural
diﬃculties
Objective 3: for adaptation and modernization of policies and systems of
education, training and employment.
The sizes of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund are respectively 190
and 18 billion EURO, available for the period 2000–2006. Annual expenditure
in the early 1990s was only 14 billion. This implies a tripling of the budget
during the last decade.
B. Description of Data and Sources26
Data in the basic regressions reported in Section III:
 The average annual growth rate of GDP per capita over the respective 5-
year interval (the dependent variable) is taken from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2000, CD-Rom). Recently, the newest
version of the Penn World Table – Mark 6.1 – has become available, in
which a diﬀerent method is used to construct purchasing power parities.
We report a robustness check with these data in Section V.
 Initial GDP per capita (in constant 1995 dollars) is taken from theWorld
Development Indicators.
 Average gross domestic savings is taken from the World Development
Indicators.
 The human capital variable is taken from De la Fuente and Dome´nech
(2000) and is available via the Internet. For a discussion on the quality of
these data, see De la Fuente and Dome´nech (2001). We have also
experimented with the more commonly used proxies provided by Barro
and Lee. Details are available upon request.
 Population growth is taken from the World Development Indicators.
26. The dataset is available at www.henridegroot.net/downloads.asp
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 In measuring European aid, we restrict attention to the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This is by far the most important
of the funds and especiallymeant to help relatively poorEUmembers (see
Appendix A for more details). Up to 1986, we rely on Vanhove (1999) for
ERDF data (source: Oﬃcial Journal of the EC). For the period 1986
onwards, we use data from the Commission Accounting System (SIN-
COM)27. We divided the amount of SF aid by the level of GDP in the
country. Furthermore, we added one to this share before taking the
natural logarithm to avoid negative numbers and to avoid problems with
countries that received no structural funds. We treated the period before
countries entered theEUas if they did not receive any cohesion support28.
 Institutional quality is proxied by the institutional quality index (ICRG)
taken from Sachs and Warner (1995). It ranges from 5.5 to 10 in our
sample.
 The EU dummy equals one if the country is a EU-member, and zero
otherwise. For countries that entered during the period under considera-
tion, the dummy represents the fraction of the time that the country was a
member. The years of entry are based on Pelkmans (1997, p. 27).
We use data for thirteen EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom) for the period from 1960–1995. Table B1 shows
summary statistics for some of the main variables of interest in the study.
Alternative proxies for institutional quality used in Section IV and
Appendix C:
 The inﬂation rate that we use is from Sachs and Warner (1995). It
measures the average inﬂation rate over the period 1965–1990 and ranges
from 1.4% to 2.6% in our sample.
TableB1
Summary statistics of the most important data
Per capita GDP in
1960 (1995 US $)
Per capita GDP
growth (% per year)
Structural Funds
(1990; % of GDP)
Mean 8623 2.9 0.32
Median 9587 2.7 0.04
Standard Deviation 3830 1.7 0.51
27. See Dome´nech et al. (2000). We are grateful to Rafael Dome´nech for making them available to us.
28. The results presented in the main text are not sensitive for this. Details are available upon request.
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 The variable trust measures the percentage of people that replies ‘most
people can be trusted’ to the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in
dealing with people?’. This proxy is used by, for example, Knack and
Keefer (1997) and derived from the World Value Survey. It ranges from
21.4 to 57.2 in our sample.
 Openness is derived fromvariables in theWorldDevelopment Indicators.
It is deﬁnedas exportsplus importsdividedbyGDP. In the regressions,we
use the natural logarithm of openness. To assess its validity as a proxy for
institutional quality, we have confronted this openness variable with the
openness variable from Sachs andWarner (1995) for a more extensive set
of countries (see footnote 18).
 The corruption perception index (CPI) is constructed by Transparency
International anddocumented in abackgroundpaper (Lambsdorﬀ2001).
It ranges from 4.2 to 9.9 in our sample.
 Central government savings (measured as current revenuesminus current
expenditures of the central government as a fraction of GDP) are taken
fromWorldDataCD–ROM,1995.Weadded 10 to this variable to ensure
positive values and comparable outcomes in our regressions. The savings
range from 4.1% to 5.9% in our sample.
 We used a number of Governance Indicators from the World Bank’s
Composite IndicatorDatasetResearchProjectbyKaufmannetal. (2002).
The indicators that we used are (with the ranges over which they vary in
our sample in brackets): Political Stability (0.81.6), Government Eﬀec-
tiveness (0.61.9) and Rule of Law (0.61.9). Higher values correspond
to better governance outcomes.
C. Alternative Speciﬁcations and Tests for Robustness
InTable C1we provide results for alternativemeasures of institutional quality.
The ﬁrst regression complements the ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 2. The latter
three speciﬁcations use WorldBank Governance Indicators to condition for
institutional quality. These speciﬁcations conﬁrm that SF are conditionally
eﬀective and illustrate the robustness of the results reported in the main text.
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In Table C2, we repeat the robustness analysis performed in Section V, but
nowwith openness as the conditioning variable instead of institutional quality.
The results conﬁrm our main conclusions.
TableC1
Diﬀerent measures for institutional quality (OLS, dependent variable: growth of GDP per capita)
Central
Government
Savings
World Bank
Governance
Indicator ‘Political
Stability’
World Bank
Governance
Indicator
‘Government
Eﬀectiveness’
World Bank
Governance
Indicator ‘Rule
of Law’
Log of initial GDP per capita 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.025
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log of investment rate 0.019 0.016 0.022 0.022
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Log of human capital 0.024 0.022 0.016 0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Log of (population growth10.05) 0.026 0.024 0.036 0.034
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Structural Funds 0.008 0.088 0.064 0.078
(0.029) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021)
Structural Funds  Conditioning
variable (see column header)
0.007 0.064 0.044 0.063
(0.008) (0.032) (0.020) (0.026)
Constant 0.203 0.203 0.167 0.169
(0.058) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054)
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.51
Joint signiﬁcance test SF variables 1.42 9.80 13.28 13.93
# panel observations 91 91 91 91
Note:Whiteheteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported inparentheses.,, and 
denote signiﬁcance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. The test for the joint signiﬁcance of the
Structural Funds variables is a Wald test, testing the null-hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for the
Structural Funds variables (in levels and interacted with institutional quality) are equal to zero. See
Appendix B for details about the variables and their sources.
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SUMMARY
Structural Funds are the most intensively used policy instrument by the European Union to promote
economic growth in itsmember states and to speed up the process of convergence. This paper empirically
explores the eﬀectiveness ofEuropeanStructural Fundsbymeans of a panel data analysis for 13 countries
in theEuropeanUnion.We show that – onaverage – StructuralFunds are ineﬀective.For countrieswitha
‘proper’ institutional framework, however, Structural Funds are eﬀective. The latter result is obtained for
a wide range of conditioning variables, such as openness, institutional quality, corruption and indicators
for good governance. It is robust to a wide range of robustness tests.
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